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The Desirability of Workfare as a Welfare Ordeal – 
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In this paper we challenge the conventional wisdom that using workfare as a supplementary 
screening device to means-testing is socially undesirable when the government objective is 
welfarist, namely, to ensure that all members of society will attain some minimal level of 
utility. Our argument suggests that when misreporting of income by welfare claimants is 
sufficiently manifest, introducing work requirements for welfare eligibility economizes on 
government expenditure and is socially desirable. 
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1.  Introduction 
Work  (or  training)  requirements  in  means-tested  programs  (often  called 
“workfare”)  have  seen  resurgence  in  the  past  two  decades  in  most  OECD  countries 
(OECD 2009).
1 It started in the early 1990s with the US flagship program "Wisconsin 
Works"  emphasizing  “work  first”  strategy,  followed  by  the  passage  of  the  Personal 
Responsibility  and  Work  Opportunity  Reconciliation  Act  (PRWORA)  in  1996  that 
introduced work requirements on a national basis.
2 It then spread, with variations, to 
many  countries,  including  the  Netherlands,  the  United  Kingdom,  Denmark,  Ireland, 
Austria,  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Israel  [OECD  (2005).  For  further  discussion  of 
workfare amongst other forms of Active Labor Market Policies, see Kluve (2006).  
Naturally, work or training requirements may serve to enhance the recipient’s job 
prospects by allowing the latter to acquire relevant on the job training, work experience 
and social skills. An additional role played by workfare, which is the focus of the current 
study, is in helping the government to screen welfare claimants.
3 The screening role has 
gained much support during the past two decades, reflecting a strong public sentiment, 
especially in the US but also in Europe, that welfare should be paid only to those who 
cannot support themselves [see e.g., Konow (2000) and Fong (2007)].  
                                                           
1 The OECD Employment Outlook 2009 suggests, however, shifting somewhat the focus and resources 
behind activation from the “work-first” approach which tended to dominate prior to the current global 
economic crisis to a “train-first” approach for those at high risk of long-term unemployment.   
2 The 1996 Act required a minimum of 20 hours of work (or work related activities, such as training) per 
week to be eligible for a welfare cash transfer. Compliance was assured by an extensive use of sanctions 
including benefit reductions [for further details see US DHHS (2002)].  
3 Screening is difficult as poor individuals are often characterized by low earning ability and ill health – 
information that is hard to observe or verify (e.g., mental problems and back pains are commonly stated in 
claims for government income support). 3 
 
 
The government uses various screening (direct and indirect) devices to overcome 
these  difficulties.  These  include,  inter  alia:  (1)  means  testing  by  reviewing 
documentation,  conducting  interviews  and  testing  by  specialists;  (2)  'tagging'  [a  la 
Akerlof (1978)], namely, basing eligibility on observable attributes correlated with ability 
(e.g., old age, education level, observable disability); (3) offering in-kind transfers that 
intended beneficiaries would find more attractive (such as wheelchairs) and (4) setting 
welfare ordeals, namely, adding requirements that undeserving individuals would find 
relatively  costly  and,  hence,  would  self-select  out  of  the  program  [Nichols  and 
Zeckhauser (1982)].  
Workfare, even if completely useless in its effect on labor market skills, can serve 
as a form of welfare ordeal. This aspect has been emphasized in two influential papers by 
Besley  and  Coate  [(1992)  and  (1995)].  Assuming  that  a  training  program  does  not 
contribute at all to the participants’ human capital (thus entailing pure deadweight loss), 
Besley and Coate have nonetheless demonstrated that when the government objective is 
income-maintenance,  namely,  the  government  seeks  to  ensure some  minimal  level  of 
consumption,  introducing  work  requirements  as  a  supplement  to  means-testing  can 
economize on government costs. The idea underlying the screening role played by work 
requirements lies in the fact that as participating in workfare is time-consuming, low-skill 
individuals incur a lower opportunity cost of participation compared with high-skill ones. 
Thus, by introducing workfare, the government can enhance the target efficiency of the 
welfare program. A key observation of Besley and Coate (1995) was that the desirability 
of using workfare for screening purposes crucially hinges on the government specified 
objective.  When  the  objective  is  income  maintenance  the  government  ignores  the 4 
 
 
disutility (associated with forgone leisure) suffered by individuals from working and/or 
participating in training programs. However, when the government objective is welfarist, 
namely,  when  these  costs  are  fully  taken  into  the  social  calculus,  Besley  and  Coate 
demonstrate that workfare becomes undesirable.  
Cuff (2000) and Moffitt (2006) extended the Besley and Coate [(1992), (1995)] 
result  (that  workfare  is  desirable  under  income  maintenance)  by  demonstrating  that 
workfare may still be desirable even when the government accounts for disutility from 
labor. Both studies adopt a non-welfarist view, by defining social objectives that deviate 
from a social welfare function that is based only on individuals' stipulated preferences. 
Cuff (2000) emphasizes the widely acknowledged importance of targeting benefits to the 
"deserving poor" by ignoring the "excessive" disutility from labor incurred by "lazy" 
individuals;  whereas,  Moffitt  (2006)  assigns  an  intrinsic  value  to  work  provided  by 
sufficiently able individuals amongst welfare claimants, thereby capturing the common 
perception that work is important per se.   
To sum up, the literature so far has established the case for workfare only when 
assuming  non-welfarist  objectives.  In  this  paper  we  attempt  to  establish  the  case  for 
workfare under the welfarist approach.
4 We do so by extending the Besley and Coate 
framework  to  plausibly  allow  for  welfare  claimants  to  misreport  their  income  when 
applying  for  means-tested  benefits.
5  We  show  that  when  misreporting  of  income  by 
                                                           
4 We acknowledge the importance of the non-welfarist approach, reflecting the strong public support for 
tying welfare to notions of deservedness and the merits of work per se, and wish to show that even when 
assuming a welfarist objective [which is the standard approach to the normative analysis of the design of 
tax and transfer systems in line with Mirrlees (1971)], workfare can nonetheless be desirable.  
5 Welfare fraud is very significant in the US and in most other countries and misreporting of income is the 
leading form of welfare fraud [Wolf and Greenberg (1986); Burtless (1986); Luna (1997); Romanov and 
Zussman  (2001);  and  Martinelli  and  Parker  (2009)].  There  is  widespread  concern  about  the  abuse  of 5 
 
 
welfare-claimants  is  sufficiently  manifest,  introducing  work  requirements  for  welfare 
eligibility is socially desirable.
6  
The policy implications suggest that whether and the extent to which workfare 
should be used for screening purposes depends on the extent of misreporting. Evidence 
taken  from  the  World  Values  Survey  (WVS)  database  reveals  significant  differences 
across countries in the civic attitudes towards misreporting [see Algan and Cahuc (2009) 
for discussion].
7 We argue that the use of workfare would be especially warranted in 
countries where norms of misreporting appear to be prevalent.  
The structure of the remainder of the paper will be as follows. In the coming 
section  we  introduce  a  simple  analytical  framework.  In  section  3  we  introduce  the 
government problem. In section 4 we derive the properties of the social optimum. Section 
5 concludes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
welfare programs  but  accurate  assessments  are  difficult to  find  and the issue  has  gained  only  modest 
attention  in  the  public  finance  literature  [Yaniv  (1997)].  The  issue  is  closely  related  to  that  of  the 
underground economy as a whole [see Schneider and Enste (2000) and Schneider (2007) for broad surveys 
of 145 countries]. Misreporting of income is especially prevalent in developing countries but is significant 
in developed countries as well. For example, the US Treasury estimated the gross federal tax gap for 2001 
at $ 345 billion, not including income generated in criminal activity [IRS (2007)]. The following two 
famous anecdotes can give us a sense of what is at stake. In 1987 the number of dependent (e.g., children) 
exemption allowances claimed by US taxpayers fell by 7 million (!) following the introduction of a new 
requirement to report the dependent's Social Security number [Szilagyi (1990)]. Similarly, the number of 
taxpayers claiming child-care credits dropped from 8.7 million in 1988 to 6 million in 1989 following the 
introduction of a new requirement to provide the details of the care provider.  
6  Our paper emphasizes the role of workfare in augmenting means-testing as a screening device, but it also 
contributes to the strand in the optimal tax literature that examines the design of tax-and-transfer systems in 
the presence of tax evasion [see, e.g., Cremer and Gavhari (1996)]. This literature usually focuses on 
enforcement through the probability of detection and the penalty function. We demonstrate the potential 
role of workfare in reducing the extent of misreporting.    
7 Civic attitudes were measured using the following question: “Do you think it can always be justified, 
never be justified, or something in between to claim government/state benefits to which  you have no 





2.  The Model 
Consider an economy with a continuum of individuals who differ in their innate earning 
ability, denoted by w. We assume that the targeted population consists of two types of 
individuals:  low-ability  and  high-ability  individuals,  whose  earning  abilities  are 
respectively denoted by  w and  w, with  0 > > w w . There are in fact more than just two 
types in the economy, but we assume that these other types are of higher skills and none 
of them apply for welfare benefits. Taxing these higher-skill types would serve to finance 
the benefits claimed by the two types we consider explicitly. Without loss of generality 
we assume that the two ability groups in question are of equal size, normalized to unity. 
We  further  assume  that  the  production  technology  (of  the  single  consumption  good, 
which  price  is  normalized  to  unity)  exhibits  constant  returns  to  scale  and  perfect 
substitution between the two skill levels. Assuming a competitive labor market, it follows 
that  w  denotes  the  wage  rate  of  a  w-type  individual.  We  follow  Mirrlees  (1971)  by 
assuming that earning abilities are private information, unobserved by the government, 
thus restricting ourselves to second best re-distributive policy rules. 
  Following Besley and Coate [(1992) and (1995)] and Diamond (1998) we assume 
that individuals’ preferences are represented by a quasi-linear utility function:  
(1)  d l h c d l c U ⋅ − − = α α ) ( ) , , , ( , 
where c denotes consumption, l denotes the time allocated to non-leisure activities (such 
as work, training, workfare, etc.), h is strictly increasing and strictly convex and d is an 
indicator  function  which  assumes  the  value  of  one,  if  the  individual  is  cheating  the 
welfare agency (that is, misreporting her income in order to be eligible for some transfer) 7 
 
 
and  zero  otherwise.  The  parameter  α   denotes  the  individual  cost  associated  with 
cheating measured in consumption terms. This parameter may reflect the moral (psychic) 
costs entailed by misreporting as well as the (expected) fine set by the administration 
(recalling the quasi-linear form). Typically, the first element may vary across individuals 
whereas the second element may be uniform. In any event, we assume that  α , which 
captures  both  elements,  varies  across  individuals.  For  concreteness  we  simplify  by 
assuming  that  α   is  uniformly  distributed  over  the  support  ] , 0 [ α   for  both  types  of 
individuals.  Notice  that  in  the  limiting  case  where  ∞ → α ,  there  is  no-misreporting; 
namely,  the  set  of  cheaters  is  of  zero  measure  (the  standard  case  examined  by  the 
literature which would serve as a benchmark for our analysis). 
  The government is seeking to ensure a minimal standard of well-being for all 
individuals, denoted by some pre-specified utility level,  u ˆ . Denoting by V and V , the 
utility levels derived by a low-ability and a high-ability individuals, respectively, in the 
absence of  government  intervention,
8 we  assume  that  V u V < < ˆ .  In  words,  the  high-
ability individuals attain by themselves a higher level of well-being than the minimal 
threshold set by the government, whereas the low-ability individuals can only achieve 
this level of well-being with government assistance.  
  In order to achieve the utility maintenance goal defined above, the government is 
offering  means-tested  (non-negative)  transfers  (we  are  thus  considering  a  welfare 
maintenance program and not an income tax). The individuals choose whether to apply, 
                                                           
8 Formally,  )] / ( [ max w y h y V y − =  and  )] / ( [ max w y h y V y − = , with y denoting the level of income given 
by  l w y ⋅ = . 8 
 
 
at all, for benefits. In case they do apply, the level of transfer is based on their reported 
(not necessarily truthfully) level of income. Naturally, the government may induce the 
agents to report truthfully by an appropriate choice of detection probabilities and fines (or 
may  otherwise,  in  certain  circumstances,  be  able  to  verify  the  true  level  of  income 
directly),  but  as  we  will  focus  on  the  role  of  workfare  in  addressing  the  issue  of 
misreporting, we simplify by assuming that the transfers paid are based, solely, on the 
reported level of income. 
 
3.  The Government Program   
The government offers transfers based on reported levels of income so as to ensure the 
pre-specified  level  of  well-being  at  minimum  cost.  Note  that  the  utility  cost  of 
misreporting,  d α , does not depend on the extent of misreporting but rather only on the 
decision whether to misreport or not.
9 Therefore, all individuals that decide to misreport 
will choose to report that level of income which makes them entitled to the highest level 
of transfer. This is true for both skill levels. As there are only two skill levels, it follows 
that there will be at most three reported levels of income: the true income of a low-skill 
individual,  the  true  income  of  a  high-skill  one  and  the  income  level  reported  by 
“cheaters”  (of  both  types).  Thus,  we  can  confine  attention  to  transfer  schedules  that 
consist of only three different income-dependent transfers.  
                                                           
9 This simplifying assumption is fairly realistic as the targeted population of welfare applicants is spanned 
over a limited range of low income levels, so that the extent of misreporting cannot vary considerably over 
this population. 9 
 
 
In  fact,  we  can  further  restrict  ourselves  to  schedules  with  only  two  income-
dependent  transfers.  To  see  this,  consider  a  schedule  with  three  different  income-
dependent transfers (with all three levels of income being actually reported). Naturally, 
cheaters will report that income level which entails the highest transfer. Therefore, by 
construction, the two other levels of income (and associated transfers) must be chosen by 
high-skill and low-skill non-cheaters. The government can do better, then, by eliminating 
the highest transfer (that is, the transfer chosen by cheaters) from the offered schedule. 
This will certainly cut the cost of the program. At the same time the pre-specified level of 
(target) utility is still maintained, as the transfer accorded to a low-skill individual who 
truthfully  reports  her  income  suffices,  by  construction,  to  attain  the  minimum  utility 
level. We thus restrict attention to schedules consisting of only two income-dependent 
transfers.  
Denote by  y (respectively,  y) the income level reported by low- (respectively, 
high)  skill  non-cheating  individuals.
10  The  transfers  are  such  that  those  reporting  an 
income of  y  (respectively,  y ) enjoy a consumption level of    c (respectively,  c). In 
other words, the transfers offered to those reporting an income of  y  (respectively,  y ) are 
given by  y c−  (respectively,  y c − ). As the government aims to raise the well-being of 
the low-skill individuals, it follows that  y c y c − ≥ − , so that all cheaters will choose to 
report an income level of  y . Note, that all low-skill individuals, irrespective of whether 
or not they misreport their income, receive the same transfer,  y c − . Thus, the cost of the 
                                                           
10 With no loss in generality we can assume that the high-skill individual participates in the program. This 
follows, as we can always treat a program in which the high-skill individual does not participate, as one 
which offers a zero transfer at her laissez-faire choice of income.  10 
 
 
transfer program depends only on how many high-skill individuals choose to cheat (and, 
naturally, on the two levels of transfer). Note also that as the disutility from misreporting 
rises with respect to α , it follows that there will be a cutoff level of α , denoted by  0 α , 
such that all high-skill individuals with  α below  0 α will choose to cheat and all other 
high-skill individuals will truthfully report their income ( α α ≤ ≤ 0 0 ). Recalling that α is 
uniformly distributed over the interval  ] , 0 [ α , it follows that  α α / 0  measures the number 
of high-skill cheaters. Hence, the cost of the transfer program to the government is given 
by: 
(2)  ) ( ) / 1 ( ) ( ) / 1 ( 0 0 y c y c E − ⋅ − + − ⋅ + ≡ α α α α . 
We further assume that in order to be eligible for the high transfer the individual 
must not only satisfy the means-testing (reporting an income level of y ), but also abide 
by  a  work  requirement  (workfare).  Denote  by  ∆  the  work  requirement  set  by  the 
government,  measured  in  hours.  Following  Besley  and  Coate  (1992)  and  (1995),  we 
assume that the workfare requirement serves for screening purposes only and does not 
affect the productivity of the individuals. By doing so, we attempt to establish a case for 
workfare  under  the  most  unfavorable  circumstances  where  workfare  entails  a  pure 
deadweight loss.  
The  government  is  seeking  to  minimize  the  cost  given  by  equation  (2),  by 
choosing the 6-tupple  > ∆ < , , , , , 0 α c y c y  subject to the following constraints: 
(3)  u w y h c ˆ ] ) / [( ≥ ∆ + − , 11 
 
 
(4)  V w y h c ≥ − ) / ( , 
(5)  ] ) / [( ) / ( ∆ + − ≥ − w y h c w y h c , 
(6)  ) / ( ] ) / [( w y h c w y h c − ≥ ∆ + −  
(7)  ) / ( ) ( 0 w y h c V y c − = − ∆ + − α , 
where  [ ] ] ) / [( max ) ( ∆ + − = ∆ w y h y V y  . 
We  turn  next  to  interpret  the  constraints  (3)-(7).  The  first  constraint  [condition  (3)] 
ensures that the transfers are set so as to achieve the goal of attaining the pre-specified 
level of utility, u ˆ. As was already explained, we assume with no loss of generality that 
high-skill  individuals  participate  in  the  program.  This  is  reflected  in  condition  (4). 
Conditions  (5)  and  (6)  are  the  standard  self-selection  (incentive  compatibility/no-
mimicking) constraints  for  the  high-ability  and  low-ability  non-cheaters,  respectively. 
The conditions state that each type is as well-off with her own bundle as she would be by 
pretending to be (mimicking) the other type. Notice that in order to be eligible for the 
transfer designed for the low-ability type (given by  y c − ) an individual has to satisfy 
both an income test (the reported income level has to be  y ) and abide by the work 
requirement (a training period which lasts  ∆ hours). The final constraint [condition (7)] 
determines the level of misreporting in equilibrium. A high-ability individual with moral 
cost  0 α  is just indifferent between truthfully reporting his income ( y ), thereby receiving 
the transfer  y c − , which provides him with the level of utility given by the expression on 
the right-hand side of (7); and misreporting, that is pretending to earn (reposting)  y , 12 
 
 
participating  in  the  workfare  program,  thus  being  entitled  to  the  transfer  y c − ,  but 
actually  choosing  to  earn  an  (optimal)  different  level  of  income, 
[ ] ] ) / [( max arg ∆ + − = w y h y y y ,  thereby  attaining  the  level  of  utility  given  by  the 
expression  on  the  left-hand  side  of  equation  (7).  Evidently,  all  those  high-ability 
individuals whose α  is below  0 α will choose to misreport.
11 Note, that as we assumed, 
with no loss of generality, that all individuals participate in the program, it follows that 
there is no need to introduce non-negativity constraints on the transfers. 
  Consider as a benchmark the Besley and Coate [(1992), (1995)] model in which 
there is no misreporting. In our model this amounts to letting  ∞ → α . We will plausibly 
assume that there is some (but not an excessive level of) misreporting. That is, we will 
assume that α  is sufficiently high but finite. This assumption will be made more precise 
in  what  follows.
12  Also,  note  that  when  the  desired  minimal  level  of  utility,  u ˆ,  is 
sufficiently small  (close to V ), then the re-distributive policy is relatively easy to attain 
and  is  therefore  of  limited  interest.  Indeed,  in  this  case,  and  in  the  absence  of 
misreporting, the government can attain its objective without causing any distortion.
13 
We will therefore consider the plausible case of u ˆ being sufficiently high. 
                                                           
11 Notice, that there are, naturally, also low-ability individuals who will choose to misreport in equilibrium 
(those with least moral inhibitions; namely, those incurring the lowest moral costs). However, as low-
ability individuals are in any case entitled to the larger level of benefit,  y c− , this will not affect the 
government  objective  and  optimization  considerations.  Notice  further,  that  by  revealed  preference 
considerations, those individuals who choose to misreport will derive a higher level of utility than that 
derived by those individuals who report truthfully, thus the individual rationality (voluntary participation) 
condition will be satisfied and the level of utility will exceed the minimal threshold set by the government 
also for those who misreport. 
12 See footnote 14 in the appendix. 
13 To see this, note that the government can set  y and y at their laissez faire levels,  y c =  and set  y c > to 
attain the minimal utility goal. As, by revealed preference, the high-skill individual strictly prefers her 13 
 
 
We turn next to examine which of the inequality constraints (3)-(6) is binding in 
the optimal solution. Clearly, a cost-minded government would never choose to offer a 
level of transfer exceeding what is required to attain the pre-specified utility level, u ˆ; so 
that it is straightforward to show that constraint (3) is binding. Turning next to condition 
(4), we can show (see the appendix for details) that this constraint is not binding when the 
pre-specified utility level, u ˆ , is sufficiently large, as we indeed assume. We finally turn 
to the two incentive compatibility constraints given by the conditions in (5) and (6). First 
note that by the single crossing property of the individuals' indifference curves (which 
follows  from  the  convexity  of  h),  both  constraints  cannot  simultaneously  bind.  The 
natural conjecture would be that the incentive constraint of the high-ability type will bind 
in the optimal solution. We can indeed confirm this conjecture under our assumption that 
α  is sufficiently large (see the appendix for details). 
Summarizing: constraints (3) and (5) are binding, whereas, constraints (4) and (6) 
are not binding, hence, dropped out when deriving the properties of the optimal solution.  
   
4.  Characterization of the Optimal Program 
We suppose first that the workfare requirement (namely, ∆) is fixed and derive the first-
order  conditions  for  the  optimal  solution.  Let  η µ λ    and    , denote  the  multipliers 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(laissez  faire)  bundle  to  the  (laissez  faire)  bundle  chosen  by  the  low-skill  individual,  it  follows  by 
continuity that when the desired minimum level is small enough, that is when  c is sufficiently close to y , 
the self-selection constraint of the high-skill individual will be satisfied and there will be no reason to 
introduce distortions (in order to mitigate this constraint). 14 
 
 
associated with the binding inequality constraints (3) and (5), and the equality constraint 
(7), respectively. The Lagrangean expression is then given by: 
(8) 
)], / ( ) ( [ )] / ( ) / ( [       
] ˆ ) / ( [ ) ( ) / 1 ( ) ( ) / 1 ( ) (
0
0 0
w y h c V y c w y h c w y h c
u w y h c y c y c L
+ − − ∆ + − ⋅ − ∆ + + − − ⋅ −
− ∆ + − ⋅ − − ⋅ − + − ⋅ + ≡ ∆
α η µ
λ α α α α
 
where  0 , > µ λ , by virtue of our earlier derivations. The first-order conditions are given 
by: 
(9)  , 0 ) / 1 ( / 0 = + − − = ∂ ∂ η µ α α c L  
(10)  , 0 / ) / ( ' / ) / ( ' ) / 1 ( / 0 = ⋅ − ⋅ + − − = ∂ ∂ w w y h w w y h y L η µ α α  
(11)  , 0 ) / 1 ( / 0 = − + − + = ∂ ∂ η µ λ α α c L  
(12)  , 0 / ) / ( ' / ) / ( ' ) / 1 ( / 0 = + ⋅ − ⋅ + + − = ∂ ∂ η µ λ α α w w y h w w y h y L  
(13)  . 0 / )] ( ) [( / 0 = + − − − = ∂ ∂ η α α y c y c L  
Employing the first-order conditions in (9)-(13) one can obtain the standard properties 
derived by the literature; namely, a zero (implicit) marginal tax rate levied on the high- 
skill individual [‘efficiency at the top’, see Sadka (1976)] and a strictly positive (implicit) 
marginal tax rate imposed on the low-skill individual (see the appendix for details). 
We turn next to examine the desirability of imposing a workfare requirement (as a 
supplement  to  means-testing).  Specifically,  we  ask  whether  imposing  some  workfare 
requirement  is  better  than  none.  To  do  this,  we  employ  the  envelope  theorem  and 
differentiate the Lagrangean with respect to ∆, evaluating the derivative at  0 = ∆ : 15 
 
 
(14)  0 0 / ) / ( ' ) / ( ' / = ∆ = ∆ ∆ ∂ ∂ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ = ∆ ∂ ∂ V w y h w y h L η µ λ . 
When  the  expression  in  (14)  is  negative,  imposing  some  workfare  requirement  is 
desirable, as it results in a reduction in government expenditure. This turns out to be 
indeed the case when the underlying skill-gap is large and cheating is not viewed as 
highly immoral: 
Proposition:  There  exist  0 0    and    α w   such  that  workfare  is  a  socially  desirable 
supplement to income-testing for all       and    / 0 0 α α < > w w w . 
Proof: See the appendix. QED 
  The rationale underlying our result is as follows. When the skill gap is large, a 
workfare requirement can serve as an effective screening device, as it is much more 
costly for the high-ability individuals to take part in these programs relative to low-ability 
ones.  However,  workfare  programs  entail  a  large  deadweight  loss  (in  light  of  our 
assumption that they serve purely for screening purposes). The previous literature [Besley 
and Coate (1995)] has ignored an important phenomenon of misreporting by welfare 
claimants.  In  such  a  case  it  was  shown  that  when  income  testing  is  employed  for 
screening  purposes,  there  is  no  desirable  supplementary  role  played  by  workfare. 
However, when agents can misreport their income thereby rendering the income testing 
less effective, workfare can serve to mitigate the high-ability individuals’ incentive to 
misreport. Put differently, workfare makes it more costly for high-ability individuals to 




5.  Conclusion 
In a second best setting, an egalitarian government seeking to target benefits to the least 
well-off  members  of  society  is  faced  with  a  fundamental  screening  problem.  The 
government often resorts to means-testing as a measure to enhance the target efficiency 
of its welfare system.  In recent years, public outcry about welfare dependency and the 
allegedly  weak  incentives  provided  to  claimants  to  leave  welfare  have  caused  many 
developed countries to introduce some form of work requirements (workfare) for welfare 
eligibility. In two influential papers Besley and Coate [(1992) and (1995)] have argued 
that  the social  desirability  of  introducing  (non  skill-enhancing)  workfare  merely  as  a 
supplementary screening device to means-testing crucially hinges on the specification of 
government  objective.  They  demonstrated  that  using  workfare  is  justified  when  the 
government objective is poverty alleviation (income maintenance) but unwarranted with 
a  welfarist  objective  in  mind  (utility  maintenance).  The  literature  that  followed  has 
extended the analysis of Besley and Coate, but established the case for workfare only by 
invoking some form of non-welfarist government objective. In this paper we challenge 
this result and provide a welfarist justification for the use of workfare. We incorporate a 
realistic feature of misreporting into the standard framework, and show that when welfare 
claimants, who apply for means-tested benefits, can misreport their income, workfare 
becomes  a  desirable  component  of  the  welfare  system  even  when  the  government 
objective is utility maintenance. 
  The  contribution  of  the  paper  is  thus  twofold.  First  it  provides  a  normative 
justification for the prevalent use of workfare along the lines of the welfarist approach 
which  is  the  standard  in  the  optimal  taxation  literature.  Second,  it  incorporates  an 17 
 
 
important feature of misreporting to the analysis of the design of welfare system and 
demonstrates the potential role played by workfare in mitigating the claimants’ incentive 
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Proof that constraint (4) is non-binding in the optimal solution 
Let  V u = ˆ .    By  virtue  of  (3),  it  follows  that  V w y h c ≥ ∆ + − ) / ( .  Thus, 
V w y h c > ∆ + − ) / ( ;  hence,  by  virtue  of  (5),  V w y h c > − ) / ( .  It  follows  that  the 
constraint in (4) is satisfied as a strict inequality. By continuity considerations, the result 
extends to values of u ˆ sufficiently close to V . This completes the proof. QED 
Proof that constraint (5) is binding in the optimal solution 
Consider first the benchmark case in the absence of misreporting; namely, when ∞ → α . 
In this case we can ignore constraint (7), as the set of individuals who misreport is of zero 
measure. Suppose by way of contradiction that constraint (5) is not binding. Thus, as 
constraint (4) is also non-binding, then by continuity considerations, one can slightly 
reduce the level of  c without violating any of the constraints. This will economize on 
government expenditure and attain the desired contradiction to the presumed optimality. 
Consider  next  the  case  where  a  non-zero  measure  of  individuals  is  misreporting.  A 
reduction in  c would have two effects on government expenditure, a mechanical effect 
and  a  behavioral  one.  As  in  the  previous  case  with  no  misreporting,  a  reduction  in 
cwould lower the level of government expenditure. However, as can be observed from 
condition (7), the number of high-ability individuals who misreport would then adjust in 
equilibrium.  In  particular,  0 α will  increase  (that  is  the  number  of  individuals  who 22 
 
 
misreport  will  increase).  This  will  result  in  a  corresponding  increase  in  government 
expenditure, which may all in all increase overall government expenditure. To see why 
an increase in  0 α  will increase the government expenditure (other things equal), note that 
in the optimal solution it is necessarily the case, that y c y c − ≥ − . If it were not the case, 
one could replace the presumably optimal program with a universal system that would 
offer all agents a lump-sum transfer equal to  y c − , which would trivially satisfy all 
constraints and reduce total government expenditure. Then, it follows from the objective 
in equation (2) that when the system is indeed means-tested (that is  y c y c − > − ), an 
increase in  0 α  does increase total government expenditure.  
The  overall  impact  on  government  expenditure  of  the  combined  mechanical  and 
behavioral effects is generally ambiguous. However, by virtue of our assumption that the 
level of misreporting is not too large, the mechanical effect would prevail, and our result 
in the case of no misreporting extends by continuity consideration.  
 
Signing the Optimal Marginal Tax rates 
Substituting for the term  ) / 1 ( 0 α α − from (9) into (10) and re-arranging yields: 
w w y h = ) / ( '        (A1) . 
Thus, we obtain the standard ‘efficiency at the top’ result.  
Substituting for the term  α α / 0  from (11) into (12) and re-arranging yields: 23 
 
 
(A2)   ] / ) / ( ' 1 [ / 1 / ) / ( ' w w y h w w y h − ⋅ − = λ µ . 
By virtue of the single crossing property and the fact that the incentive constraint of high-
skill  individual  [constraint  (5)]  is  binding,  y y > .  Hence  by  virtue  of  (A1)  and  the 
convexity  of  h,  1 / ) / ( ' < w w y h .  It  follows  that  1 / ) / ( ' < w w y h .  Thus,  the  (implicit) 
marginal tax rate levied on the low-skill individual is strictly positive. 
 
Proof of the Proposition 
The construction of the proof will be in three stages. 
Stage I 
We first turn to simplify the expression in (14), which is reproduced for convenience: 
 (A3)  0 0 / ) / ( ' ) / ( ' / = ∆ = ∆ ∆ ∂ ∂ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ = ∆ ∂ ∂ V w y h w y h L η µ λ . 
Substituting for the term ( η µ − ) from (9) into (11) and re-arranging yields: 
2      (A4) = λ . 
By  the  definition  of  ) 0 ( V   and  by  virtue  of  (A1)  it  follows  that  ) / ( ) 0 ( w y h y V − = . 
Substituting   into (7) and re-arranging yields then: 
) ( ) (       (A5) 0 y c y c − − − = α . 
Substituting into (13) yields: 24 
 
 
α α η /      (A6) 0 − = . 
Employing (A4) and (A6) to simplify (11) yields: 
α α µ / 2 1      (A7) 0 − = . 
Differentiating V with respect to ∆, employing the envelope theorem, yields: 
w V − = ∆ ∂ ∂ = ∆ 0 /      (A8) . 
Substituting into the expression in (14) yields:  
(A9)  w w y h w y h L ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ = ∆ ∂ ∂ = ∆ η µ λ ) / ( ' ) / ( ' / 0 . 
Finally, by employing conditions (12), (A4), (A6) and (A7), following some algebraic 
manipulations, one can obtain the following simplified form of the expression in (A9): 
(A10)  ) / ( ' ) 1 / ( 2 ) / 1 ( / 0 0 w y h w w w L ⋅ − ⋅ − + ⋅ = ∆ ∂ ∂ = ∆ α α .   
Step II 
We next derive two useful properties of the optimal system that will be employed in what 
follows. In order to prove these properties we make an additional technical assumption 
that  0 ' ' ' ≥ h .  Notice  that  when  h  takes  an  iso-elastic  functional  form,  the  assumption 
implies that the (constant) elasticity of labor supply is bounded above by unity, which is 
consistent with existing empirical evidence [see, e.g., Salanie (2003)]. 




(i)  Substituting for  µ η λ    and    ,  from (A4), (A6) and (A7) into (12) and re-arranging 
yields the following simplified expression: 
(A11) 
) / 2 1 (
] / ) / ( ' / ) / ( ' [ ) / 2 1 (








w w y h w w y h
w w y h . 
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Now  suppose  by  way  of  contradiction  that  0 / ) / ( 0 > ∂ ∂ α α α .  Then,  as  h  is  convex, 
0 ' ' ' ≥ h ,  by  assumption,  and  α α / 0 <1/2,  by  our  earlier  derivations,  it  follows  that 
0 / > ∂ ∂ α y ,  otherwise,  it  is  straightforward  to  verify  that  the  right-hand  side  of  the 
expression in (A12) is positively signed, whereas, the left-hand side is negatively signed. 
Now consider the figure below, which depicts the optimal solution for the government 
program  in  the  net-income  -  gross-income  (c,  y)  space.  We  denote  by 
) / ( ) , , ( w y h c y c w U − ≡ , the utility derived by an individual of type w with gross income 
y and net income c. Note first that by the convexity of h, the single crossing property 
holds and in particular, the indifference curve of the low-ability type is steeper than that 26 
 
 
of  the  high-ability  type  [the  slope  of  the  indifference  curve  is  given 
by w w y h w MRS / ) / ( ' ) ( = ]. By virtue of our earlier derivations, conditions (3) and (5) are 
binding in the optimal solution. Fixing the initial level of α , the equilibrium is given by 
the two bundles depicted as triangles in the figure. Now consider a downward shift in α ; 
namely  α α < ' . By virtue of our presumption,  ) ( ) ' ( α α y y < and α α α α / ' / ' 0 0 < , hence, 
0 0' α α < .  By  virtue  of  (A1)  the  gross  income  level  chosen  by  the  high-ability  type 
remains unchanged (at the efficient level). The new equilibrium is then given by the two 
bundles depicted as squares in the figure. 
Figure: The Optimal Solution for the Government Problem 
 
By virtue of our earlier derivations,  1 / ) / ( ' < w w y h , thus the slope of the indifference 
curve of the low-ability type in the initial equilibrium (the triangle lying on the steeper 
indifference curve) is lower than unity. Thus, it follows that  ) ( ) ( ) ' ( ) ' ( α α α α y c y c − > − . 
C 
Y 
u y c w U ˆ ) , , ( =
) , , ( y c w U
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As can be straightforwardly observed from the figure,  ) ( ) ( ) ' ( ) ' ( α α α α y c y c − < − . We 
thus conclude: 
)] ( ) ( [ )] ( ) ( [ )] ' ( ) ' ( [ )] ' ( ) ' ( [ α α α α α α α α y c y c y c y c − − − > − − − . 
However, by virtue of (A5) the last inequality implies that  0 0' α α > . We thus obtain the 
desired contradiction.  
(ii)  This part follows immediately from the expression in (A12) and part (i).  
Step III 
Our final step would be to provide sufficient conditions for the expression in (A10) to be 
negative.  By virtue of (A7) and as the incentive constraint of the high-skill individual is 
binding, it follows that  2 / 1 / 0 ≤ α α . A sufficient condition for the expression in (A10) to 
be negative is hence: 
(A13)  0 ) / ( ' ) 1 / ( 2 2 / 3 < ⋅ − − ⋅ w y h w w w . 
By part (i) of the lemma, the term  α α / 0 is decreasing with respect to α . Suppose that α  
is sufficiently small such that the term  α α / 0  attains its upper-bound; namely,  α α / 0 =1/2 
) 0 ( = µ .
14 In this case, as the multiplier associated with the high-ability type’s incentive 
compatibility  constraint  is  equal  to  zero,  it  follows  from  (A11)  that  w w y h = ) / ( ' . 
Substituting into (A13) then yields: 
                                                           
14 One can show that in this case  [ ] 0 )] / ( [ )] / ( [ 2 > − − − ⋅ = w y h y w y h y α . Our assumption that the extent of 
misperception is not too large is then formally given by  [ ]. )] / ( [ )] / ( [ 2 w y h y w y h y − − − ⋅ > α  28 
 
 
(A14)  4 / 0 ) ( 2 2 / 3 > ⇔ < − ⋅ − ⋅ w w w w w . 
Taking the other limiting case, by letting  ∞ → α , it follows from (A4), (A6) and (A7), 
that 0    and    1 = = η µ  (and evidently,  2 = λ ). By the convexity of h,  ) / ( ' ) / ( ' w y h w y h > . 
It thus follows from (A9) that  0 / 0> ∆ ∂ ∂ = ∆ L . That is, imposing a workfare requirement in 
the  case  of  no  misreporting  is  undesirable.  We  thus  replicate  the  result  obtained  by 
Besley and Coate (1995)].  Thus, the expression in (A10) is positive. Hence, 
(A15)  0 ) / ( ' ) 1 / ( 2 2 / 3 > ⋅ − − ⋅ w y h w w w . 
By  continuity,  employing the  intermediate value theorem,  there exists  some  value  of 
α for which: 
(A16)  0 ) / ( ' ) 1 / ( 2 2 / 3 = ⋅ − − ⋅ w y h w w w . 
By  virtue  of  the  lemma,  as  the  expression  on  the  left-hand-side  of  (A16)  is  strictly 
increasing with respect to  α , this value is uniquely defined. Denote it by  0 α . It then 
follows  that  when  the  moral  costs  entailed  by  misreporting  are  sufficiently  small
15 
) ( 0 α α < ,  and  when  the  difference  between  the  skill  levels  is  large  enough 
) 4 / ( 0 = > w w w imposing workfare is socially desirable as it economizes on government 
expenditure. This completes the proof. 
                                                           
15 But higher than the lower bound defined in footnote 14. 